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A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF 
AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE IN 
THE CASINOS OF MACAU: 
REALITY OR FICTION?
Hugo Luz dos Santos
Brief description of the issue of “intelligent ambient” in the casinos of Special 
Administrative Region of Macau (SARM) 
The concept of intelligent ambient or IAm1 (from the English Ambient Intelligence)2 
represents a digital and pervasive ambient created by the convergence of the 
technologies of radio transmission and broadcasting (as an identification by 
radiofrequency (RFID)3, agents of software, sensor networks, and processing of data by 
personal mobile devices. The convergence of technologies in cyberspace facilitates the 
integration and the interaction of the devices named as “intelligent”4. This new reality in 
the casinos of the Special Administrative Region of Macau portrays an ambient 
(intelligent) in which the players are surrounded by intuitive interfaces embedded in 
every corner (even the most inhospitable ones) of the casino5.
Consequently, as a non-derogable rule, casinos have a remarkable paraphernalia of 
objects (subsumed therefore to the taxonomy digital ambient) embodying one capacity of 
analysis of context and of adjustment to the needs of the gamblers of the casinos of 
Macau6,7.
In fact, those intuitive interfaces capture, collect, and store, in real time, the casino 
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1 In this sense, HUGO LUZ DOS SANTOS, “The gaming in the casinos of the Special Administrative Region of Macau and the 
Surveillance: is someone always watching? (Some notes regarding privacy)”, still in preparation, and that we will follow very 
closely from here.
2 About the issue of the intelligent ambient, in the epistemological framework of online dispute resolution, O. RABINOVICH-
EINY & E. KATSCH, “Lessons from Online Dispute Resolution for Dispute Systems Design”, in: Online Dispute Resolution 
Theory and Practice, Hague, Netherlands, Eleven International Publishing, (2013), pp. 39-40; M. FRIEDEWALD, E. 
VILDJIOUANE, Y. PUNIE, D. WRIGHT, “The Brave New World of Ambient Intelligence: An Analysis of Scenarios 
regarding Security, Security and Privacy Issues”, in: Security in Persuasive Computing. Proceedings of the Third International 
Conference, New York, Springer, (2006), p. 3934; in the British doctrine, A. THIESSEN/E. LOODER, “The Role of Artificial 
Intelligence in Online Dispute Resolution”, in: Workshop on Online Dispute Resolution at the International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law, Edinburgh, United Kingdom, (2003), pp. 4-5.
3 In this sense, ALIAKSANDRA YELSHYNA/FRANCISCO ANDRADE/PAULO NOVAIS, “Um ambiente inteligente de 
resolução de litígios – Repercussões jurídicas na privacidade e protecção de dados”, in: Scientia Ivridica (SI), Revista de Direito 
Comparado Português e Brasileiro, Janeiro/Abril 2015 – Tomo LXIV – Número 337, Braga, (2015), pp. 113 and following, 
which we will very closely follow.
4 E. ARTS/ R. ROOVERS, “Embedded System Design Issues in Ambient Intelligence”, in: Ambient Intelligence: Impact on 
Embedded System Design, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, (2003), pp. 11-29.
5 M. FRIEDWALD, E. VILDJIOUNAITE/Y.PUNIE & D. WRIGHT, “The Brave New World of Ambient Intelligence: An 
Analysis of Scenarios Regarding Privacy, Identity and Security Issues”, in: Security in Pervasive Computing. Proceedings of the 
Third International Conference, New York, Springer, (2006), p. 119.
6 Y. PUNIE, “The Future of Ambient Intelligence in Europe: The Need for More Everyday ife”, in: Communications and 
Strategies, Sevilha, (2005), p. 142.
7 P.NOVAIS/R.COSTA/D-CARNEIRO/J.NEVES, “Inter-Organization Cooperation for Ambient Assisted Living”, in: Journal 
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patron’s personal data, and ultimately intend to shape and standardize their real 
necessities, habits, and attitudes, thus allowing to maximize and optimize the intelligent 
ambient in which those interfaces were primarily created.
With that goal in mind, the systems of IAm of the casinos of the Special 
Administrative Region of Macau have to collect and process large amounts of personal 
data and define the players’ profiles. These personal data are frequently collected and 
processed without any notification of the casino patrons8, through devices and techniques 
which perform a silent and continuous tracking of players’ personal habits9, profaning, at 
least in theory, one of its key requirements - the existence of consent of the holder of the 
personal data10,11.
Thus, in the intelligent ambient of the casinos there is a certain working density in 
the systems of surveillance, that claim the risk of  undue and unsolicited processing of 
personal data12,13.
In the cases of use of personal data for spurious purposes mentioned above, that 
unreachable core weakens itself and violates the thematic privacy and spatial privacy of 
the casino patrons. 
Closely following the lesson of the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfGE), the thematic privacy that is precisely reappointed 
the same universe of factual constellations covered by privacy in a material sense, refers 
to those data or realities that the holder of the fundamental right intend to subtract to 
the curiosity and to the public discussions14,15, such as sexuality, deviant behaviors and 
diseases16.
On the other hand, the sphere of privacy in a spatial sense belongs to an area of 
entrenchment of the individual that ensures the possibility of meeting and being with 
himself and of evasion17, which normally happens inside the hotel rooms of casino 
patrons18.
This means there is an unreachable core of privacy that emerges from personal data 
of the casino patrons that involves – and identifies with – the universe of things, facts, 
events, experiences, emotions, and places, meaning that they are a core of irreducible 
8 Regarding the data mining, the doctrine, with good reasons, refers that “a persistent and generalized data capture, 
and second, the treatment and intersection in real time little relevant data can reveal sensitive information allowing the 
development of the knowledge of the person concerned”; in this sense, DANIEL SOLOVE, “Introduction: Privacy self-
management and the consent dilemma”, in: Harvard Law Review, Volume 126, (2012), pp. 1888-1889.
9 We will not address in this article, the (candent) of the issue data mining which, in the words of authorized doctrine, “data 
mining allows inferences not only about the direct subject of surveillance, but about other people with whom they live, work 
and communicate”; In this sense, JACK M. BALKIN, “The Constitution in the National Surveillance State”, in: Yale Law 
School Legal Scholarship Repository, Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 225, (2008), p. 13; approximately, DANIEL SOLOVE, 
The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, New York University Press, New York, (2004), pp. 42-49.
10 ALIAKSANDRA YELSHYNA/FRANCISCO ANDRADE/PAULO NOVAIS, “Um ambiente inteligente de resolução de 
litígios – Repercussões jurídicas na privacidade e protecção de dados”, cit., p. 114.
11 According to the Portuguese doctrine, “It can only be considered as informed consent that who is given, having the holder 
become aware of the purpose and the exact extent of his/her consent”; in this sense, monografically, CATARINA SARMENTO 
E CASTRO, Direito da Informática, Privacidade e Dados Pessoais, Almedina, Coimbra, (2005), p. 206.
12 ALIAKSANDRA YELSHYNA/FRANCISCO ANDRADE/PAULO NOVAIS, “Um ambiente inteligente de resolução de 
litígios – Repercussões jurídicas na privacidade e protecção de dados”, cit., p. 114.
13 As it is in this regard well stated by qualified doctrine, “Specialized software tracks chips and specific cards. Pit bosses 
know which tables are turning a profit and which ones are losing. Moreover, casino patrons can be tracked via players”; in this 
sense, JESSICA D. GABEL, “CSI Las Vegas: Privacy, Policing, and Profiteering in Casino Structured Intelligence”, in: UNLV 
Gaming Law Journal, Volume 3, Spring 2012, Nevada, Reno, (2012), p. 41.
14 In this sense, Ruling of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerricht – BVerfGE), in: Neue Juristichen 
Wochenschrift (NJW), (2008), p. 1794.
15 In the Portuguese doctrine, MANUEL DA COSTA ANDRADE, “Domicílio, intimidade e Constituição”, in: Revista de 
Legislação e Jurisprudência (RLJ), Ano 138.º, N.º 3953, Novembro-Dezembro de 2008, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, (2008), p. 
110.
16 In this sense, Ruling of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerricht – BVerfGE), in: Neue Juristichen 
Wochenschrift (NJW), (2000), p. 1022.
17 See, in the German doctrine, about the contraposition of the sphere of the thematic privacy/sphere of the spatial privacy, 
ENGELS/JÜRGENS, in: Neue Juristichen Wochenschrift (NJW), (2007), p. 2517.
18 In this sense, Ruling of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerricht – BVerfGE), in: Neue Juristichen 
Wochenschrift (NJW), (2008), p. 1794.
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subjectivity, individuality and personhood, and thus, logically, the casino patron 
legitimately intends to keep to himself and for a small number of others19. Therefore, 
being that a space of guardianship of privacy converted into a place of fulfillment 
of private life20,21, it is understood that the use of personal data of casino patrons for 
strange purposes (e.g., blackmail) to the services trade and of functionalities given by 
the casinos of Special Administrative Region of Macau has, as a result, a big profligate 
(grosser Lauschangriff)22,23,24. Furthermore it embodies a derogation from the principle of 
the dignity of the human person and of the right to the free development of personality25 
(art.º 30.º, n.º 1, of the Basic Law of Macau). 
The proportionality (Verhältnismäβigkeitsgrundsatz) as a way of legitimation of the 
secondary use of big data, for law enforcement purposes – the Law of the Weighing 
ea Weight formula
As previously discussed26, the principle of proportionality that in recent 
decades achieved remarkable recognition in theory and practice of the control 
of constitutionality27,28 consists of three subprinciples: adequacy, necessity, and 
the proportionality in a strict sense. These three subprinciples express the idea of 
optimization29,30. 
In fact, the principles require optimization in relation to what is factual and legally 
possible31. The subprinciples of adequacy and necessity refer to the optimization 
concerning the existent factual possibilities.This case suits perfectly in the sphere of 
factual availability of the casinos, the information shared with other casinos and with 
law enforcement agencies, for purposes of prevention and repression of criminality 
related to the fraudulent game.
The subprinciple of proportionality in a strict sense refers to the optimization 
19 MANUEL DA COSTA ANDRADE, “Domicílio, intimidade e Constituição”, cit., p. 110.
20 In Ruling of the German Constitutional Court (BGHSt), 50, 206, JR, (2006), p.216. In the same sense, BGHSt 42, 372, in: 
Neue Juristichen Wochenschrift (NJW), (1997), p. 1018.
21 Thus, in the case Malone v.United Kingdom referred that the access and use of data concerning traffic of communications 
form subject which is covered by the protection scope of no. 1 of ART 8 of the ECHR (Ruling of 
02/08/1984, complaint no. 8691/79). The Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) referred that this right «is closely 
connected with the right to respect of private life» (Ruling of 09/11/2010, Volkerund Markus Schecke, process 
no. C-92/09 e C-93/09). On the other hand he clarified that the protection traffic data of communications is covered by the 
scope of protection of this fundamental right thus Ruling of 08/04/2014, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., processes 
no. C-293/12 e C-594/12, that abrogated Directive 2004/26/CE, by violation of the articles 7 and 8 of the Letter of
Fundamental Rights); in this sense Ruling of Constitutional Court of Portugal, no. 403/2015, which we even literally very 
closely follow , available in www.dgsi.pt.
22 In this sense in the German doctrine, BÖCKENFORDE, in: Juristichen Zeitung (JZ), (2008), p. 926.
23 In this sense, the leading case of Ruling of German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerricht – BVerfGE) 109, 279 = 
in: Neue Juristichen Wochenschrift (NJW), (2004), pp. 1000-1002.
24 The notion, jurisprudentially shaped, of the grosser Lauschangriff was set again in the Ruling of German Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgerricht – BVerfGE), known as Carolina II, in: Neue Juristichen Wochenschrift (NJW), (2008), 
pp. 1793 and ss; about this seminal jurisprudential decision, see, in the german doctrine, S. ENGELS/U. JÜRGENS, 
“Auswirkungen der EGMR-Rechts-prechung zum Privatsphärenschutz. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Umsetzung des 
“Caroline” – Urteis in deutschen Recht”, in: Neue Juristichen Wochenschrift (NJW), (2007), p. 2520.
25 In this sense, MANUEL DA COSTA ANDRADE, “A Tutela Penal da Imagem na Alemanha e em Portugal”, in: Revista de 
Legislação e Jurisprudência (RLJ), Ano 141.º, N.º 3972, Janeiro-Fevereiro de 2012, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, (2012), pp. 
143-144.
26 HUGO LUZ DOS SANTOS, “O jogo e a aposta nos casinos da Região Administrativa Especial de Macau: (breves) subsídios 
para o enquadramento jurídico das outstanding chips e para a distribuição dinâmica do ónus da prova: o “admirável” mundo 
novo no Gaming?”; in: Revista de Administração Pública de Macau (RAP), n.º 110, Macau, China, (2016), passim.
27 See, ALEC STONE/JUD MATHEWS, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitucionalism”, in: Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, n.º 47, (2008), pp. 72-164.
28 See, DAVID M. BEATTY, The Ultimate Rule of Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, (2004), pp. 34-49.
29 About the North American constitutionalism, see LOUIS SEIDMANN, Never Mind the Constitution; On Constitution 
Disobedience, New York, N.Y., Oxford University, (2012), pp. 12-35.
30 the North American constitutionalism, see JEREMY WALDRON, Book Review Never Mind the Constitution; On 
Constitution Disobedience, in: Harvard Law Review, Volume 127, (2014), pp. 1151 e ss.
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concerning the legal existent possibilities. In this case, the legal system of gaming and 
betting and of the credit for gaming are sufficiently ingrained in Macau.
Consequently, the advocated normative solution - the share of information for 
purposes of prevention and repression of the criminality related to the fraudulent game – 
passes the test of proportionality (Verhältnismäβigkeitsgrundsatz). 
From such fact we can infer that the referred normative solution is suitable because 
it does not exclude the adoption of ways that prevent the performance of at least one 
principle. It is necessary because the ways above adopted reach their goal to a certain 
extent. This means that the referred normative solution is covered with diaphanous 
mantle of proportionality in the strict sense.
The weighing is the objective of the third subprinciple of proportionality in the strict 
sense. As mentioned above, this subprinciple expresses the weighing of existent legal 
possibilities32. It corresponds to a line that can be named the Law of Weighing33. This line 
says: “The higher the degree of non-fulfillment or allocation of a principle, the greater 
must be the importance of completing the colliding principle” and under that (the Law of 
Weighing) a Weight Formula defines the specific weight of all colliding principles34. 
In this case, the Law of Weighing and the Weight Formula (able to subsume in the 
case of the secondary use of information processing and of information dissemination)35, 
determine that the prevailing principle (the prevention and repression of criminality 
related to the fraudulent game) legitimates constitutionally and legally the normative 
solution of the share of information among casinos agencies of law enforcement36, 
that being a “minimal impairment test of the protected rights” and “the least restrictive 
alternative”37,38,39.
31 See, ROBERT ALEXY, Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, (2002), pp. 47-49.
32 In a recent Portuguese publication, ROBERT ALEXY, “Direitos Fundamentais e princípio da proporcionalidade”, 
tradução por Paulo Pereira Gouveia, in: Revista O Direito, Ano 146.º, (2014), IV, Almedina, Coimbra, (2015), p. 821.
33 ROBERT ALEXY, Theory of Constitutional Rights, cit., p. 102.
34 ROBERT ALEXY, “The Weight Formula”, in: Frontiers of Economics Analysis of Law – Studies in the Philosophy 
of Law, 3, Cracow, Jagiellonian University Press, (2007), pp. 9-27; ROBERT ALEXY, Theory of Constitutional Rights, 
cit., pp. 97-99; in the German language, ROBERT ALEXY, “Die Gewichtsformel”, in: Gedächnisschrift für Jürgen 
Sonnenschein, Verlag, Köln, (2003), pp. 771-792.
35 For that reason we can understand that “the Weight Formula is intrinsically linked to legal discourse. It expresses a 
basic argumentative form of legal discourse”; that is why it is related to “the Subsumption Formula as the only basic 
argumentative way of legal discourse”; in this exact sense in the English language, ROBERT ALEXY, “On Balancing 
and Subsumption”, in: Ratio Juris, n.º 16, (2003), pp. 433-448; ROBERT ALEXY, On the Nature of Legal Principles, 
Archives for Philosophy of Law, vol. Supl. 119, Franz Steiner & Nomos, (2010), pp. 9-18; ROBERT ALEXY, A Theory 
of Legal Argumentation, Oxford, Claredon Press, (1989), pp. 221-230; in the German language, monografically, ERNST-
WOLFGANG BÖCKENFORDE, “Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen. Zur Gegenwartige Lage der Grundrechtesdogmatik”, 
in: Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, (1991), pp. 188-190; ROBERT ALEXY, 
Theorie der Juristichen Argumentation, (1978), 6ª Ed., Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, (2008), pp. 273-283.
36 As it is referred in doctrine, “There are certainly many desirable instances of secondary use. Information might be used to 
stop a crime or to save a life”; DANIEL SOLOVE, “Taxonomy of Privacy”, cit., p. 519.
37 In this sense very recently in the North American doctrine, VICKI C. JACKSON, “Constitutional Law in a Age of 
Proportionality”, in: The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124: 3094, (2015), p. 3114, which we will very closely follow.
38 In this respect, the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court, RJR-MacDonald Inc v. Canada (A.G.), (1995), 3 
S.C.R. 199, 342-343 (Can.) (McLachlin J.) (emphasizing also that “the law must be carefully tailored so that rights are 
impaired no more than necessary”), acknowledging that “a range of reasonable alternatives may exist”, but indicating that 
“if the government fails to explain why a significantly less intrusive and equally effective measure was not chosen, the law 
must fail”).
39 In the same sense, in the jurisprudence of the Us Supreme Court,  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (the 
concept of proportionality is central to the Eight Amendment); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct 2537 (2012); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Solem v. Helm, 463, U.S. 277, (1983) (assessing the proportionality of a sentence 
of life imprisionment); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 480 (1867) (suggesting that the Eight Amendment 
clauses as a whole prohibited punishments that were excessive, or cruel, or unusual); O´Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 
(1892) (quoting a lower court opinion construing the Eight Amendement and in analogous state constitutional provision to 
ban “excessive”, “oppresive”. Or “unreasonably severe” punishments, but for other reasons rejecting and attack on a lenghty 
sentence imposing cumulative time on multiple counts).
